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1. Introduction 
Experimentally Comparing Uncertain Inference 
Systems to Probability 
Ben 1='. Wise 
Thayer School, Dartmouth 
Hanover, NH 03755 
Uncertainty is a pervasive feature of the domains in which expert systems are supposed 
to function. There are several mechanisms for handling uncertainty, of which the oldest 
and most widely used is probability theory. It is also the only one which is derived from a 
formal descr iption of rat ional behavior [Savage 54]. There are many axiomatic arguments 
that no other system can do better than probab ility theory in terms of results [de 
F inet t i74]. For use in pattern-d irected inference systems, or rule-based inference 
eng ines, artificial intell igence researchers have favored others (such as fuzzy set theory 
Dempster-Shafer theory, or the algorithms used in the Prospector or Mycin expert 
systems), largely for reasons of s implic ity, speed, low data requ irements, and 
expla inabil i ty. We w ill present techniques w ith which to measure how well these 
alternatives approx imate the results of probabil ity theory, to assess how well they 
perform by those measures, and to find out what underlying features of a problem cause 
strong or weak performance. 
Because the amount of data required to fully specify a probabil i ty d istribution is 
enormous for problems of practical s ize, some technique must be used to estimate a 
d istribution when only partial informat ion is given. Moreover, there is no formally correct 
Bayesian way to d irectly handle the type of uncertain information which expert systems 
must use. We g ive intu itive and axiomatic arguments that f i tting maximum entropy pr ior� 
and using minimum cross entropy updating are the most appropr iate, or the most nearly 
Bayesian, ways to meet both requirements. Hence, we will compar�e U IS's to min imum 
cross-entropy updating (MXE). We have concentrated on an analysis of the -system used in 
MY CIN  [Shortliffe 76]. Its operat ions have been analyzed to elucidate both which basic 
problem-features affect, or b ias, the answers, and the directions of the b iases. Ser ies o1 
experiments have been done on test cases to find out how these b iases affect the 
performance of the uncertain inference systems. We present and d iscuss both the 
motivation and design of our analysis techniques, and the specific structures which were 
found to have strong effects on b ias and on performance. 
2. Outline of Our Method 
The basic goal of our work is to suggest what condi tions produce sign ificant differences 
in the outputs of uncertain inference systems ( UIS's). The emphasis is on comparing the 
outputs, not the s impli'city, explicability, or ease of construct ion of the UIS itself. We 
will present the method by g iving the rat ionale for each part of the exper imental 
procedure, as given in f igure 2-1. The bottom is where the ME/MXE inference is performed 
while the inference of the UIS being explored is done in the top row. 
Conversions: To answer questions about d ifferences in performance, a common 
interpretat ion of the inputs and results is required to make them commensurable . 
Presumably, the ultimate purpose of any expert system is to lead to better decisions -
e i ther d irectly by the system or ind irectly by the human user. If two d ifferent 
representations of uncertainty lead to making the same decision, then they are 
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Figure 2·1: Basic Experiment Design for Comparisons 
operationally equivalent. According to Bayesian Decision theory, decisions reveal beliefs 
about the outcomes on which the decisions are based. Even if the decision-maker does no1 
think in probabilistic terms, if he chooses coherently he will act as though he did. In 
principle, if a non-probabilistic approach to uncertainty provides a theory of how to make 
both inferences and decisions based on its representations of uncertainty, then this woulc 
imply an operational equivalence between beliefs expressed in the probabilistic and 
non-probabilistic forms, where they produced the same decision. This would allow direct 
comparison of the representations. Notably, however, the non-probabilistic approaches dq 
not provide agreed upon decision strategies, and so this is unfortunately impossible. 
Nevertheless, there are obvious, simple ways to make transformations from to probabilit) 
for at least some U IS's. For MYC, the conversions are taken from the definitions of 
Certainty Factors [Shortliffe 76]: CF= 1 means true, so p 1 (x)= 1; CF=O means no evidence, so 
we stay at the prior probability, p1(x)=Po(x); and CF=-1 means definitely false, so p1(x)=0. 
Values between these three points are found by piecewise linear interpolation. As these 
definitions were provided by the system's designers, we regard them as being quite 
accurate statements of the intended interpretation. One simplified version of probabilit� 
always assumes that antecedents are conditionally independent, given their common 
conclusion; we will denote this version as Cl. Using conversions, we can state inference 
rules and data in terms of probabilities, convert them to an alternative representation, an• 
remain confident that the two still represent the same knowledge. At the end of an 
experiment, we invert the conversion to change the U IS's conclusions to probabilities, fo1 
direct comparison. 
U IS Inference: The rule-strengths and data obtained by the above conversions are given to 
the UIS currently being tested, and propagated up a rule-tree according to the particular 
U IS's rules for "and", "or", modus ponens evaluating the reliability of evidence, or 
combining the results of different rules with the same consequent. The "and", "or", "not", 
and implication (or modus ponens) operations for MYC are given in equation 1 The "and" and 
"or" operations are assumed; the "not" operation is easily derived. 
cf(A1 & A2)=min[cf( A1 ), cf( A2)] cf( A1 or A2) = max[cf( A1 ), cf( A2)] {1) 
cf(...., A) = -cf(A) cf1 (C) = cf(CjA)cf1 (A), if cf1 (A)�O. 0 otherw ise 
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One should note that this last rule for modus ponens contradicts what Bayesian theory 
requires. That is, if A's being true increases p 1 (C) above its prior value, then A's being 
false must lower p 1 (C) below its prior value. But in MYC, A's being false causes C to sta} 
at its prior probability. We define a UIS which is identical to MYC, except that it also 
repsonds to negative CF's for A. Because we call it Two-Sided Mycin, label it TSM. 
The definition of a MYC rule-strength is quite similar to that for the C F  of a proposition, 
except that we look at the change in the conclusion's probability, given the antecedant, 
relative to its prior probabilitiy. That is, we compare Po(CJA) and Po(C). The idea is that 
the CF's on the input evidence represent the change in belief attributable to some external 
evidence available only to the expert, while the rule C F's represent the change in belief in 
C which is attributable to changed belief in A, when C and A are both in the expert system. 
When two rules refer to the same consequent, C, we use the rule in equation 2 for 
combining their results. The result of rule R 1 is denoted by x, and the result of rule R 2 by 
y, and the resulting CF .in C by z. Surprisingly, this rather complicated rule is commutative 
and associative, so it can be applied to an arbitrary number of rules, in arbitrary order. 
z = x + y - xy, if x<:!O , y<:!O 
= x + y + xy, if x�O , y�O 
= (x + y) I [1 - min(lxl, lyl)], if mixed signs. 
(2) 
We will very briefly discuss another UIS, called Cl, which is a simplified version of 
probability which represents all its rules as having their antecedants conditionally 
independent, given the consequent. Propositions A1 and A2 are conditionally independent, 
given C, if equation 3 holds. 
p ( A1 & A2 I C) = p(A1 I C) p(A2 IC) (3) 
Intuitively, this states that the factors which affect A1 and A2 are unrelated, once we 
have compensated for all those which affect their relationship to C. Of course, it is not 
always possible for A1 and A2 to be related only through that one C, particularly if they 
themselves share a common antecedant, but the approximate formula can be used 
nonetheless. To do modus ponens, we use equation 4, which states that the updated 
odds-ratio for C is determined from its old odds-ratio, and the product of a series of 
factors, one for each antecedent. An approximate formula for interpolation is used when 
the p(Ai) are between 0 and 1, as in equation 5. 
Pt<C!At&Az) Po<AtiC) Po(AtiC) Po(C) 
Pt( -.CjA1&A2) 
=
Po( -.AtiC) Po( --.AtiC) Po( -.C) 
Pt(C) Po(A1IC)a+po( -.At!C)(l-a) Po(A21C)b+Po( --.A21C)(l-b) Po(C) 
p1( -.C)
= p0(A1(--.C)a+p0( -.A1!--.C)(l-a) p0(A2(-.C)b+p0( -.Az(-.C)(l-b) Po( -.C) 
wjzere p1(A1)=a, and p1(A2)osb and p1(C)=p1(Cla&b) 
(4) 
(5) 
ME/MXE Inference: The ME/MXE inference is a simple generalization of Bayesian 
conditioning. There are no special rules for "and", "or", modus ponens, evaluating the 
reliability of evidence, or combining the results of different rules with the same 
consequent .  The first two "operations" are done by reading the appropriate numbers off the 
posterior. The last three "operations" happen automatically when we update. We must 
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define a particular rule for uncertain inference which will appear several times -
Jeffrey's Rule. Where x is some arbitrary event, and Yi are an exhaustive and exclusive set 
of alternatives, equation 6 must hold for any distribution. In words, it says that our prio 
probability of any event x must be a combination of our probabilities for x given other 
events, Y;, weighted by our prior probabilities for those events. One may extend equation e 
from a consistency requirement to an updating rule by forming equation 7, which is the 
usual definition of Jeffrey's Rule. 
Po(x) "' L. Po(xlyi) Po(Y;) (6) I 
Po(x) = Li Po( xlyi) P1 (Yi) (7) 
Equation 7 has several notable characteristics. It always results in another coherent 
distribution. If x is quite likely given a particular y i then raising the probability of that 
y i will raise the probability of x , so it exhibits an intuitively pleasing sensitivity. The 
new probabilities may be specified only over an exhaustive and exclusive set of events. 
The requirement of exhaustiveness is not really a problem - if new probabilities are giver 
over a non-exhaustive set of events, one need only specify that the remaining probabilit) 
fall over the remaining events, and so obtain an exhaustive set of events. 
As discussed in [Diaconis 82], Jeffrey's Rule is a special case of many other generalized 
updating methods. In particular, it is a special case of the iterative proportional fitting 
procedure ( IPFP), which is in turn a special case of minimum cross entropy (MXE) updating 
as proved in [Wise 86]. The IPFP is an extension to the case where the intersection of Yi 
and Yj is non-empty, simply by using Jeffrey's Rule for each Y; , over and over, until the 
result no longer changes significantly. The I P F P  is the only form of MXE which we will 
need in this paper . However, we will briefly review the general justification of  MXE. 
Surprisingly, the maximum entropy estimation of priors and the minimum cross entropy 
updating method are completely defined by several weak properties, as proven by Shore 
and Johnson [Shore and Johnson 80]. They proved that any method for forming or updating < 
prior which possessed these properties would give the same answer as maximum entropy 
or minimum cross entropy, respectively. Thus, MEJMXE analysis has been singled out as nO'\­
just one more heuristic among many, but as the only one which has these four simple 
consistency properties. One should note especially that it has been singled out whether i1 
is considered as a "stand alone" method or as a computationally feasible approximation tc 
Bayesian analysis. It is quite important that this proof does not specify that only the 
general MXE algorithms will satisfy these four properties. It states only that the result 
will be the same if we use any other method which also satisfies them. 
The four properties are defined so as to make the answer invariant when we re-phrase the 
input data in ways which are by definition equivalent. First, the method should give a 
single, unique answer for the distribution. Second, the answer should be invariant under 
1-to-1 coordinate transformations of the data or the prior distribution. Third, the answer 
should be invariant under different ways of specifying the probabilities of events which 
are independent. That is, we should be able to give marginal distributions over y and over 
x, specifying that they are independent, or to give the resulting joint distribution, and 
still get the same answer. This basically means that the inference system must 
understand what the word "independent" means. Lastly, the answer should be invariant 
under different ways of specifying the probabilities o f  sets of events which are 
independent. Many more arguments for and against MEIMXE, as well as many comparisons 
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to standard Bayesian analysis, can be found in [Wise 86]. 
Comparjsons: Given the conclusions of MXE and the conclusions (converted back to 
probabilities) of a UIS, we can then do several comparisons. Some are useful in 
elucidating when biases will be apparent and how large they will be, others are useful in 
estimating how significant those biases may be to the user. We can measure one form of 
bias by seeing if the UIS has shifted the probabilities by the same additive amount, or b� 
the same multiplicative factor. We will denote the prior probability by Po , the UIS 
estimate by PU,1• and the MX E estimate by PM, 1· We can compare the UIS-shift, defined b� 
flu =Pu,t -Po , to the MXE-shift, t:..M =PM, 1 -Po . We can run a whole series of tests, for 
different data, and do a regression of the UIS-shift against the MX E-shift, to see if there 
is consistent over- or under-response to the data, and if there is a constant bias in one 
direction, independent of the data. 
We can also do comparisons of performance by evaluating how close the UIS's estimate iE 
to the MX E answer. Because different Pt s allow different margins for error, we compare 
the actual error to a perfect match, random guessing, or the worst possible match. This 
can be done either for the absolute error or the squared error; we will use squared error. 
For MYC and TSM, with random guessing of CF's over the interval [+1 ,-1], the average of thE 
expected error in an estimate is given in equation 8. We may use the squared error to 
define a normalized performance measure, · � which is 1 if there is zero error, 0 if the 
squared error is the expected value 1J.(e2), and -1 if the squared error is the largest 
possible, with linear interpola tion between. 
(8) 
3. Outline of Biases in MYC and TSM 
In this section, our main concern will be to assess the biases which Mycin (MYC) displays 
We will also briefly discuss the modified version, TSM. As discussed earlier, the standarc 
of comparison will be MEIMXE analysis. Our general conclusions will be that each UIS is 
sometimes accurate, but sometimes quite inaccurate. The factors underlying those 
differences are described and discussed. 
The rules for MYC contain implicit assumptions; a fact which Shortliffe and Buchanan ver� 
briefly discuss at two places in [Shortliffe 76]. The and and or rules for MYC operate on 
confidence factors which denote not belief but changes in belief. Thus, we need to do 
some algebra in order to state what the assumptions are, but the end result is that the and 
and or operations are equivalent to Jeffrey's Rule, but using only one piece of the given 
data. Suppose that cf ( A1 )�0 and cf (A1 )�cf ( A2), then equation 9 holds. Given the 
definition of a MYC C F  as a re-scaling, we can restate 9 as 10, and follow the algebra to 
the last line, which as one can see is exactly the answer which MXE gives if we use only 
p1(A 1) and ignore evidence about A2 .. 
cf( A1 and A2) = cf(A1) (9: 
{10) 
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A similar derivation gives equation 11, when 0Scf ( A1 )Scf ( A2). For this equation, the 
odds-ratio answer is identical only under the additional assumption t�at A1 is a proper 
sub-set of A2 (or, equivalently, that A2 logically implies A1 . Also, equation 11 is exactly 
the MXE result if p (A2) is 1.0, implying that MYC will often over-estimate the probability 
of a conjunction when both C F's increase. Note however, that this extra assumption is 
invoked only some of the time, and depends not on prior probabilities but on how much the� 
are changed and in which direction. 
p1( -.A1) (11) P1 ( ..., (Al&A2)) • Po(-. (Al&A2))---Po( -.A,) 
For the or operation, we may also do similar algebra. For the case that cf( A1 )�0 and 
cf ( A1 )�cf (A2), we get equation 12, which is exactly the MXE answer, if we ignore evidence 
about A2. For the case that O�cf(A1 )�cf(A2), we get equation 13, which is the MXE answe1 
if we ignore evidence about A2 and assume that A2 is a proper subset A1 . Again, this 
additional assumption is only invoked sometimes.  
(12) 
(13) 
The fact that MYC updates with only one piece of data while systematicly ignoring the res 
has certain implications. For example, one would expect MYC to under-estimate the 
impact of new data. In fact, if one takes the data presented in [Shortliffe 76] , comparin� 
Mycin C F's to the correct probabilities, and does a linear regression, one finds that MYC's 
response is only about 51% of the correct amount (explaining 74% of the variance). When 
there are N pieces of input data, MYC's and and or operators will ignore N-1 of them. This 
can cause extreme errors. For example, suppose Po (A1) is quite near 1.0, and Po ( Ai) is nea 
0.0. for 2SiSN; the prior probability of their conjunction will generally be nearly zero. If 
cf (A1 )=0, and cf( Ai)=1 for all other i, then MYC will estimate the cf of their conjunction a� 
0.0, and hence estimate the posterior probability of the conjunction to remain at nearly 
zero, even though it has actually risen to be quite near 1.0. In fact, it is exactly Po ( A1 ). 
Also, in the face of contradictory data, MYC will not balance one against the other, but 
simply update with one or the other. Updating with one will have an impact in the right 
direction; updating with the other will have an impact in the. wrong direction. 
We compared the and rule for MYC and TSM, on two input items, to the results of and in 
minimum cross entropy updates. Surprisingly, we found that the following results were 
true whether the propositions were positively correlated, negatively correlated, or 
independent: if both input CF's are negative, MYC understates the impact of the data, and i 
either one or both of the input C F's are positive, MYC overstates the impact of the data. 
The analysis was done as follows. We assumed a prior distribution• which the prior 
probabilities of A1 and A2 are both one half, and the prior probability of A1 & A2 is one 
ninth. The results for this particular distribution are given in table 3-1; results for othe 
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distributions with negative correlation were qualitatively similaro 
CF(A1) CF(A2) CFmyc(A1 &A2) C Fmxe(A1 &A2) 
+o8 +o8 +08 +o776 
-08 +08 °08 °0501 
"o8 °o8 "o8 "o 991 
Figure 3·1: Negative Correlation Comparison of MYC and MXE "and" rule 
If we set their CF's to +0o8 and +0o8, this gives posterior probabilities of Oo 9 to A1 and Oo! 
to A2 o If we do an MXE update with those new probabilities, we find a posterior 
probability for (A1 & A2) of Oo801, which given the prior of one ninth, corresponds to a CF 
of +00776 for the conjunctiono MY C's value of +008 C F  for the conjunction corresponds to a 
posterior probability of Oo822o In this case, MY C has overstated the impact by only 3008%, 
which may be negligibleo If we set their C F's to +008 and -Oo8, this gives posterior 
probabilities of Oo9 to A1 and Oo 1 to A2 o If we do an MXE update with those new 
probabilities, we find a posterior probability for ( A1 & A2 ) of 0005543, corresponding to 
a C F  of -0501 o The -Oo8 C F  for the conjunction corresponds to a posterior probability of 
Oo022o In this case, MYC has overstated the impact by 59o6%, which would probably be 
significant If we set their C F's to -Oo8 and -008, this gives posterior probabilities of OJ 
to A1 and Oo 1 to A2 o If we do an MXE update with those new probabilities, we find a 
posterior probability . for (A1 & A2 ) of Oo001, or a C F  of ·o99L The -Oo8 C F  for the 
conjunction corresponds to a posterior probability of Oo022o In this case, MY C has 
understated the impact 
These results are simply explained if one bears in mind that MYC updates using Jeffrey's 
Rule, but ignores all save one piece of datao In the case of CF's with opposite signs, the 
impact of the data is over-stated because only the disconfirming evidence is usedo The 
confirming evidence, which should have lessened the impact, is totally ignoredo When botl 
have negative signs, the impact is under-stated, because MYC ignores the fact that it has 
multiple pieces of disconfirming evidence, and acts as if it only had oneo When both are 
positive, MY C also assumes that one, say A1 , is a logical consequ�nce of the other, A2, as 
shown by equation 11 0 If that "assumed rule" were true, then A2 itself would actually be 
additional evidence for A1 . Of course, this is not true in our case, and so MY C overstates 
the i mpact, because it thinks it has received more information than it really haso 
Equivalently, MY C treats A2 as having probability LO, and hence it overstates the 
probability of ( A1 & A2). 
This line of reasoning implies that the higher the positive correlation between A1 and A2 , 
the less significant will be the underestimation when both C F's are negativeo Similarly, 
we expect the over-estimation to be greater when both are positive and there is positive 
correlation, because then the two CF's are more redundant, and hence less informativeo 
Both hypotheses are confirmed by the experiments on a distribution in which A1 and A2 are 
positively correlated (i.eo p(A1 )=p ( A2)=o5, p(A1 & A2)=.389), with the results in figure 3-20 
CF(A1) C F(A2) CFmyc(A1&A2) CFmxe(A1&A2) 
+.8 +o8 +o8 +]46 
+08 -08 -.8 -. 746 
"08 °o8 •,8 -,885 
Figure 3-2: Positive Correlation Comparison of MYC and MXE "and" rule 
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We may similarly compare MYC's or rule to the MXE results. Again, and for similar reasons 
MYC understates the impact of the data whenever both C F's are positive, but the 
underestimation decreases when A1 and A2 increase in correlation. For or , MYC always 
overestimates the impact of data whenever there are C F's of mixed sign, because the 
disconfirming evidence is ignored. Whenever both CF's are negative, it makes the same 
assumption as before that one antecedent is a logical consequence of the other, and hence 
behaves as if there were an additional rule, which exaggerates the impact. 
The MYC rule for combining the results of multiple rules which bear on one consequent is 
rather complex. Because it is quadratic in the input CF's, which are non-linearly related tc 
. the probabilities, inverting and solving in the fashion of equations 10 through 13 yields 
equations which have no clear intuitive interpretation. Hence, we choose numerical 
analysis. We compared it to the ordinary or rule of MYC and the or results of MXE, for the 
previous two prior distributions over A1 and A2, as well as one in which they were 
independent. In table 3-3, the prior distribution is flat over all possible combinations of 
A1 and A2, which makes them independent with probability 0.5 each. The table displays 
the C F's for A1 and A2 at the far left. The CF's yielded by using the MYC or and rule-or 
rule are in the middle. On the far right is the C F  obtained for ( A1 or A2 ) if one converts 
the two input CF's to posterior probabilities, does the MXE update, reads the probability of 
the disjunction off the posterior, and converts that back to a C F  (using the prior 
probability of the disjunction). 
CF(A1) CF(A2) C Fmyc-or C Frule-or C Fmxe-or 
+.8 +.8 +.8 +.96 +.9600 
+.8 -.8 +.8 0.00 +.6400 
+.4 +.4 +.4 +.64 +.6400 
-.8 -.8 -.8 -.96 -. 7 467 
Figure 3-3: Independence Comparison of MYC "or", MYC "rule-or", and MXE "or" rules 
Whenever the C F's are of equal magnitude but opposite signs, the or result overestimates 
the MXE result, both of them are positive, and the rule-or result predicts no change at all. 
Whenever both C F's are positive the rule-or result is exactly the MXE result, and or 
underestimates the impact of the data. But when both are negative, the rule-or and or 
results both overestimate the impact of the data, which is a puzzling asymmetry. We wil 
now argue that the rule-or rule is equivalent to assuming independence when both CF's are 
positive, and that there is a strong negative correlation when both C F's are negative. 
Let us suppose that CF(A);:::o and CF(B) ;:::o. Recalling the definitions of positive CF's and of 
rule-or, we get equation 14. For brevity, we have designated Po (A) by A0, p1 (A) by A1, and 
so on. This equation states that the CF for ( A  or B), assuming that they are independer.tt, is 
the rule-or combination of their individual C F's. Surprisingly, the second line of equation 
14 is an identity, true for any choice of A0, A1, B0, and B1 with A0,.e1 and B0,.e1. Hence, it 
is also true for any choice which satisfies OSA0SA1 S1.0 and OSB0SB 1 S1.0. One should note 
that the assumption of independence was something which MYC was explicitly designed to 
avoid. Instead, it seems merely to have been obscured by MYC's notation, illustrating the 
point that without careful analysis, it is not clear ·what a heuristic UIS really does, or 
even whether it does what it was designed to do. 
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cf(A rule-or B)= cf(A) + cf(B)- cf(A)cf(B) (14) 
If we take the same approach when both CF's are negative, we get equation 15. But the 
second line can not be satisfied if A1 s; A0 and B1 s;s0, because the left side of the equality 
will always be larger than the right. 
cf(A rule-or B)= cj{A) + cj(B) + cf(A)cj{B) (15) 
1 1 1 1 
-+-=-+-
Al 81 Ao Bo 
Hence, for negative C F's, rule-or does not model independence. In fact, if one combines 
the or results from the distributtions with negative, zero, and positive correlation which 
we mentioned earlier, one can see from table 3-4 that rule-or corresponds to assuming a 
very strong negative correlation. This is particularly significant because the commonly 
accepted assumption of conditional independence always produces non-negative 
correlation. 
CF(A) 
-.8 
CF(B) rule-or 
-.8 -.96 
MXEminus 
-.776 
MXEindep 
-.747 
MXEplus 
-.7 46 
Figure 3-4: Comparing rule-or to various degrees of correlation 
Most authors require that an inference system obey DeMorgan's Laws, in equation 16. AI 
first, it seems that MYC's and, or, and not rules obey them. However, the CF's refer to 
change in belief, not to belief itself. Hence, it is not clear from their definitions alone 
whether MYC will actually obey DeMorgan's Laws in terms of belief. But the evidence abovE 
clearly shows that the rule-or and or operations, when combined with the non-linear 
definition of CF's, generally violate DeMorgan's Laws. This is because it assumes 
independence when CF(A) and CF(B) are both positive, but if we reverse the signs of the 
CF's by talking about CF(-. A) and CF(-.B), then it assumes a strong negative correlation. 
Hence, the results in the first case will directly contradict those from the second. 
A orB = -.(-. A  & -.B) A &B =-.(-. A or -.B) (16) 
Clearly, we have not really changed the content of the data-base, just re-named the 
propositions within it. Thus, because the operations are sensitive to the signs of the 
CF's, MYC will make completely different implicit assumptions, and get very different 
answers, purely because the propositions have been re-named. One will recall that 
invariance under 1-toQ1 one transformations was one of the desirable, defining 
characteristics of MXE updating. Not only does the MYC result depend on trivial 
restatements of the prior, but also it makes different, contradictory, assumptions about 
the prior depending on which update is performed. 
The results of the various detailed comparisons may be integrated and summarized as 
follows. Shortliffe and Buchanan's original MYC data shows an overall tendency to 
under-estimate the impact of new data by about 49%. Our more detailed analysis shows 
that the and, or, and hence also modus ponens rules systematically ignore data and hence 
typically underestimate the aggregate impact . Only the operation for combining the 
results of several rules consistently produces over-estimations of the impact, and it may 
have a significant bias toward positive C F's. Hence, we may conjecture that in the 
complete rule-system which Shortliffe and Buchanan tested, the under-estimation effecl 
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of the first three operations dominated the over-estimation effect of the last one. This 
suggests that efforts to improve the MYC system are better directed at the way it does 
and, or, and modus ponens than at the way it combines the results of separate rules. Even 
though the latter issue may have more intellectual appeal than the first three, it seems tc 
have less practical importance. 
4. Experiments on Performance 
While we have clarified some biases in MYC and TSM, we have not yet addressed the 
problem of how important those biases really are. To answer this question, we examined 
their �-performance over a broad range of differently structured sample rule-sets, and 
multiple trials of each rule-set. Space limitations preclude complete discussion of the 
data, but the general m'ethod is more important. It is important to note that our tests do 
cover a broad range of basic structures. This type of broad coverage and comparison of 
results has been lacking in the few previous studies which examined U IS's performance. 
For each rule-set, a collection of input data were evaluated, and each U IS assigned its 
average performance • the average value of � • over that set of cases. The rule-sets variac 
between one and twelve rules. The average was found by by cycling each input node 
through a range of four probabilities. Thus, if there were n input leaves, there would be 
4n cases tried, one for each possible combination of the inputs. The four values were 
always close to 0.05, 0.35, 0.65, 0.95. They were actually chosen to be random within .01 
of those values; for example, (0.053,0.349,0.643,0.945) would be a possible set of values. 
They were generated afresh for each of the 4n trials. This sampling method was chosen 
for two reasons. First, it spanned the space of input possibilities, and thus approximated 
an even distribution over the space of possible input probabilities. Second, it enabled tree! 
with different numbers of input nodes to have their performance compared, as only the 
averages were compared. Thus, the numbers derived are an estimate of average 
performance, which is distinct from the biases, which were explored earlier. The small 
examples came in eight sets, totaling 36 small examples. Each example was run for 
between 16 and 256 individual trials, for each U IS (MYC, TSM, Prospector, Fuzzy Sets , Cl, 
Independence Assumptions, and PULS). We will present some data on MYC's and TSM's 
performance over the first six sets. In each set, one or several factors were changed in 
systematic way to see the effect of different structures. 
Depth: The first two examples (dpth-2 and dpth-1) tested effects of depth. This was done 
by setting up a tree two rules deep and solving for the ME solution, giving the prior for 
dpth-2. The resulting probabilities for the intermediate nodes, 81 and 82, were then 
included as constraints on a rule-set which was just the top rule of the first set, giving 
the prior for dpth-1. Separate series of experiments were then run on each, giving average 
� performance over the top node, A. 
Byle Strength and 8yshjness: The second four examples were each just one rule. They 
tested of varying bushiness and of varying lower rule strength. The first case, bsh2-upr, 
just has the upper rule strength for A given the conjunction of 81 and 82. We add a lower 
rule strength in bsh2-u&l, a third antecedent, 83, in case bsh3-upr, and both the lower 
rule strength and third antecedent in case bsh3-u&l. Thus, the four cases form a two by 
two matrix of options. 
Shared antecedents: The third set of six examples tested some simple correlations. Cases 
2cnc-2rls-neg and 2cnc-2rls-pos had two consequents, A1 and A2 , each referred to by its 
own rule. A1 depended on 81 and 82, while A2 depended on 82 and 83 , so the rules 
shared an antecedent. In case 2cnc-2rls-pos, this antecedent was shared directly, 
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creating positive correlation between A1 and A2 . In 2cnc-2rls-neg, the antecedent has 
its negation used in the second rule, creating a negative correlation between A1 and A2 . 
In cases 1 cnc-2rls-neg and 1 cnc-2rls-pos, use the same two rules to make conclusions 
about one shared consequent, A. Similarly to the first two cases, the two rules in 
1 cnc-2rls-pos share the same antecedent, and so the satisfaction of their compound 
antecedent terms is positively correlated, while in case 1 cnc-2rls-neg, the negation is 
shared, and so the satisfaction is negatively correlated. Cases 1cnc-21yrs-neg and 
1 cnc-21yrs-pos are just like 2cnc-2rls-neg and 2cnc-2rls-pos, respectively, except tha1 
another rule has been added, so that the final conclusion is separated by one more layer o1 
rules from the source of correlationo One should note that 1 cnc-2rls-neg, 1 cnc-2rls-pos, 
1 cnc-21yrs-neg, and 1 cnc-21yrs-pos all contain undirected cycles, and hence cannot be 
perfectly modeled by the Cl system's assumptionso 
Shared Conclysjons: The fourth set of two examples (cnd-ind-2 and cnd-ind-3) test the 
effect of varying bushiness in cases where several rules bear on one consequent. As 
derived in an appendix to [Wise 86], in the ME prior conditional independence holds exactl} 
for such caseso 
Rule Strength. Bushiness. and Correlated Inputs: The fifth set of examples (bsh2-upr-pos 
bsh2-upr-neg bsh2-u&l-pos bsh2-u&l-neg bsh3-upr-pos bsh3-upr-neg bsh3-u&l-pos 
bsh3-u&l-neg) test the effects of varying bushiness, lower rule strength, and correlation 
of inputs. They reproduce the two-by-two experimental design of the second set of 
examples, but add the extra factor of explicitly introducing either the minimum or 
maximum possible correlation of the antecedents, giving a two-by-two-by-two design. 
Extreme Correlations of Inputs: The sixth set of four examples test the effects of varying 
correlation of consequents and of rules. In cases 2cnc-min-shr-ruls-pos 
2cnc-max-shr-ruls-pos, the rules share an antecedent, and so instances of their being 
sat isf ied are p o sit ively correl ated; in  cases 2c nc -min-shr- ruls-neg 
2cnc-max-shrQru ls-neg, negatively. In cases 2cnc-min-shr-ruls-pos and 
2cnc-min-shr-ruls-neg, the consequents have the minimum possible overlap; in cases 
2cnc-max-shr-ruls-pos and 2cnc-max-shr-ruls-neg, the maximum possible. Hence, we 
again have a two-by-two design. 
5. Best and Worst Results for MYC and TS M 
The three best and three worst �-performances for MYC are listed in figure 5-1; 1.0 is the 
best possible; -1.0 is the worst. From figure 5-2., we can see that sensitivity to rule 
strength should outweigh the sensitivity to antecedent correlations. The higher the upper 
rule strength, the better MYC should do. The performance on cases where the lower rule 
strength was explicitly forced down (e.g. 5.8 and 5.7) confirms this. Similarly, 
bsh2-upr-neg and bsh3-upr-neg have no lower rule strength specified, which lets them 
drift higher, and MYC does quite well. 
� 
.998 
.996 
. 994 
Case name 
1 cnc-21yrs-neg 
bsh2-upr-neg 
bsh3-upr-neg 
Case Number 
3.5 
5o1 
5.2 
.788 bsh3-u&l-pos 5.8 
.735 bsh2-u&l-pos 5.7 
.517 cnd-ind-2 4.1 
Figure 5-1: Best and Worst Results for MYC 
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0.1 
0.0 
MYC 
--- MHE 
1.0 
p (A) 
1 
Figure 5-2: Sensitivities for MYC vs. MXE 
The TSM system does read the rule-strengths off the prior, hence the only effects on 
accuracy are those which pertain to the correlations of inputs. Note that most of the bes1 
cases were with only two antecedents rather than with three (as is typical of the 
worstcases). Recalling that TSM ignores all but one of the input items, this accords wei 
with our expectation that it would do worse when ignoring 2/3 of the data than when onl� 
ignoring 1/2 of it. 
� 
.997 
.983 
-.981 
.138 
.128 
.011 
Case name 
cnd-ind-2 
2cnc-min-shr-ruls-neg 
2cnc-min-shr-ruls-pos 
bsh3-upr 
bsh3-upr-neg 
bsh3-upr-pos 
Figure 5·3: Best and Worst Results for TSM 
Case Number 
4.1 
6.2 
6.1 
2.3 
5.2 
5.6 
Another way of looking at these results is suggested by the fact that TSM's worst four 
cases were all among MYC's best cases. Moreover, TSM's average performances on its fou 
best and four worst cases are lower than the corresponding averages for MYC. This is 
because MYC essentially has "canceling errors". The problem appears when we get a 
mixture of confirming and disconfirming evidence. Because it responds to only one piece o 
data and ignores cancellation, TSM tends to over-react in one direction or the other when 
mixed data is present. However, MYC stays put at the prior value. In many cases, it is 
better to not react at all than to over-react in the wrong direction. This is an example of 
how fixing only one error (no sensitivity to disconfirming data), but. not the other (using 
only one piece of data in Jeffrey's Rule) can actually worsen performance. 
� 
.997 
.983 
.981 
.138 
.128 
.011 
Case name 
cnd-ind-2 
2cnc-min-shr-ruls-neg 
2cnc-min-shr-ru ls-pos 
Case Number 
4.1 
6.2 
6.1 
bsh3-upr 2.3 
bsh3-upr-neg 5.2 
bsh3-upr-pos 5.6 
Figure 5·3: Best and Worst Results for TSM 
330 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Table 5-4 lists the worst �-performance for each of the UIS's discussed here, and gives 
some information about robustness. Explaining the differing degrees of robustness 
provides a useful, extremely brief, summary of the relevant interactions and biases for 
each UIS. 
Cl 
+.643 
MYC 
+.517 
Figure 5-4: Worst performance for each UIS 
TSM 
+.011 
One can see that the UIS with the best worst-� was Cl, suggesting that it is the most 
robust of those tested here. This is simply because Cl uses more parameters than do the 
other UIS's, and hence has more degrees of freedom to "bend to fit the data" even in cases 
where its assumptions are unmet. For example, it can model antecedants' as having 
negative, zero, or positive correlation. In spite of having only one operation different, TSM 
performed worse than did MYC, because it only corrects one of two canceling errors. Of 
the six UIS's tested, these three were the best; the others all had average performance 
which was worse than random guessing (i.e. ��0) on at least some cases. 
6. Summary 
Our theoretical predictions of bias are born out by numerical analysis of performance. 
Thus, we have gained some insight into what the relative strengths of the effects are. 
Also, we have seen how some deleterious, or meritorious, conditions arise for subtle 
reasons, hence we have more clues to check for while trying to estimate how well a UIS 
will do in a given application. For Mycin and its variant, we found special situations wherE 
its performance was very good, but also situations where performance was worse than 
random guessing, or where data was interpreted as having the opposite of its true import 
We have uncovered independence assumptions in MYC, inspite of the fact that eliminating 
such assumptions_ was one of the designers' goals. We have found that all three of these 
systems usually gave accurate results, and that the conditional independence assumptions 
gave the most robust results. Considerations of robustness might be a critical factor in 
selecting UIS's for a given application. 
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